4．结论：金砖集团向何处去？中国向何处去？
到2020年，中国毫无疑问是一个大国，世界前两大经济体之一，这已经没有任何疑问了。它的崛起改变了由美国和现行大国领导建立的秩序。美国鼓励所有金砖国家融入世界经济，尤其是支持邓小平极为成功地为中国制定的“改革开放”战略。作为这一过程的一部分，中俄加入（或再加入）了布雷顿森林秩序。当这些新兴大国崛起后，现行大国经常抵制领导作用分享。尽管中国和其他金砖国家从未想要抛弃全球治理秩序，中国仍声称有自己的规则制定权力，作为崛起中的大国这是自然的，并借助外部选项获得地区和全球影响力。
竞争性大国政治的回归使现有的中国和金砖国家模式复杂化了，但并未使它不可行。再往前走，中国不需要依赖金砖集团，但金砖集团对北京的国际战略仍有作用。中国继续表明在它认为重要的问题上有金融治略的领导作用，但像历史上的其他大国一样，有时候它的行为也好像它有权力重写或重新解释全球规范和规则，以相对于他国更有利。
本书的末章论述了金砖国家集团若能回到最初的原则，该集团未来的成功将更有可能。最初使金砖国家走到一起的原因在于它们是世界上最大的、增长迅速的经济体，意欲在塑造国际关系中发挥更大作用。从吉姆·奥尼尔（当时是高盛的首席经济学家）到劳伦斯·萨默斯的杰出精英人士，承认金砖国家政府应成为顶尖国际政策制定者中的组成部分。然而，甚至在2020年初全球疫情暴发之前，多数金砖国家经济体都在经历增速放缓，若非经济停滞的话。确保它们持续的国际影响力要求金砖国家在利用了易得的增长来源后提高生产率，避开中等收入陷阱。这一研究支持了社会科学家们的发现，即如果它们未能调整其制度水平以适应每一个阶段的发展，各国在每一个发展水平上都存在风险，跌入一个低增长均衡。对制度水平持续改进的需要不仅适用于中低收入国家，也适用于顶尖的经济体如中国和美国。(34)
就金砖国家在完成困难的国内改革任务时显示领导作用的程度而言，它也抬升了其声望、可信度和影响力。世界面临紧迫的多种全球性挑战——从传染病到气候变化到贫困及核扩散，如果大国的领导人能抵制过分的单边主义和重商主义，表明在增强多边机构方面的领导作用，这些问题就能获得最佳的解决办法，这些多边机构实际上有助于建设一个更可持续的未来。鉴于未来充满了各种风险和不确定性，本书的作者们为邓小平在面对需要“摸着石头过河”的改革时实行的路径点赞。如果它们决定坚毅前行，金砖国家和中国是大有前途的。
2020年4月
(1) 存在至少三种主要国际秩序：（1）布雷顿森林经济治理秩序，金砖国家成员是其积极参与者，就中国而言是自1944年开始；（2）联合国治理秩序，其中俄罗斯和中国是五常俱乐部成员，与其他常任理事国合作，包括保护其特权地位；（3）美国的同盟安全秩序，不包括任何金砖国家成员。
(2) 八次年度峰会（2009—2016）各个公报都呼吁全球储备多元化，摆脱美元，指出“为不同的力量格局设计的国际治理结构正显示出丧失合法性和有效性的明显迹象”，这羞辱了西方各国政府。见第六次金砖国家峰会公报。金砖国家峰会公报及其他文件的完整汇编，见the BRICS Information Centre，University of Toronto，Canada，http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/。
(3) 除非专门说明，经济增长数据来自国际货币基金组织的《世界经济展望》（World Economic Outlook，Washington，D.C.：IMF，October，2019）。
(4) 然而，美国已不再是净债权大国。现在美国是最大的债务国，而今日最大的债权国，根据所拥有的外国净资产（净国际投资地位即NIIP），是日本、德国和中国。关于各国的国际货币和金融力量的不同面向，见Leslie Elliott Armijo，Daniel C. Tirone and Hyoung-kyu Chey，“The Monetary and Financial Powers of States：Theory，Dataset，and Observations on the Trajectory of American Dominance，”New Political Economy 25，no. 2（2020），174-194。
(5) 进一步的发展，见Cynthia Roberts，“The BRICS in the Era of Renewed Great Power Competition，”Strategic Analysis 43，no. 6 (2019)：1-18。
(6) “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,”December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
(7) Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. (emphasis in the original), p. 2.
(8) Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Us Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
(9) Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security 44: 1 (Summer 2019): 157; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?”International Security 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013): 7-48.
(10) Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press, 2014; David A. Lake, “Economic openness and great power competition: Lessons for China and the United States,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 3 (2018): 237-270.
(11) European Commission, “EU-China: A Strategic Outlook,”12 March 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en.
(12) See for example, the annual reports to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; and “Made in China 2025” Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016.
(13) The estimates of China's investment to the BRI varies ranging from ＄1.2 to 1.3 billion by 2027 to as high as ＄8 trillion.
(14) Kevin G. Cai, “The One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing's New Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics,” Journal of Contemporary China 27 no. 114 (2018): 831-847.
(15) Weifeng Zhou, and Mario Esteban, “Beyond Balancing: China's Approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China 27 no. 112 (2018): 487-501.
(16) World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors. Washington D.C.: World Bank. (2019), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.pdf.
(17) World Bank, Belt and Road Economics, Chapter 4.
(18) The G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers meeting at Fukuoka in June 2019 first endorsed these principles.
(19) AIIB. 2020, “Project Summary: Approved Projects,” https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/summary/index.html.
(20) AIIB. 2020, “AIIB Looks to Launch USD5 Billion COVID-19 Crisis Recovery Facility,” https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2020/AIIB-Looks-to-Launch-USD5-Billion-COVID-19-Crisis-Recovery-Facility.html.
(21) NDB, “Opening Address of Mr. K. V. Kamath, President, New Development Bank at the Fourth Annual Meeting on April 1, 2019,” 1 April 2019. https://www.ndb.int/president_desk/opening-address-mr-k-v-kamath-president-new-development-bank-fourth-annual-meeting-april-1-2019/.
(22) NDB, “New Development Bank Issues Coronavirus Combating Bond Raising RMB 5 Bln,”3 April 2020. https://www.ndb.int/press_release/new-development-bank-issues-coronavirus-combating-bond-raising-rmb-5-bln/.
(23) Xinhua, “IMF to Consider Nomination of Kristalina Georgieva for Managing Director,”9 September 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/09/c_138378908.htm.
(24) China's Foreign Ministry press release “Working Together to Defeat the COVID-19 Outbreak,”26 March 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1761899.shtml.
(25) IMF. 2020, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4. See also Eswar Prasad, “Has the Dollar Lost Ground as the Dominant International Currency?”Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution (September 2019). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/DollarInGlobalFinance.final_.9.20.pdf.
(26) “Dethroning the Dollar,” The Economist, January 18, 2020; Cynthia Roberts, “Avoid Allowing Opponents to ‘Beat America at its Own Game’: Ensuring US Financial and Currency Power,”in Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China's Worldwide Activities (SMA White Paper, 2019), chapter 23; and Orange Wang and Zhou Xin, “Coronavirus sparks US dollar dilemma for China as Federal Reserve ramps up easing,” South China Morning Post, March 26, 2020.
(27) Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Jan Knoerich, and Yuanfang Li, “The Role of London and Frankfurt in Supporting the Internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi,” New Political Economy 24 no. 4 (2019): 530-545.
(28) Barry Eichengreen and Guangtao Xia, “China and the SDR: Financial Liberalization through the Back Door,” Quarterly Journal of Finance 9 no.03 (2019): 1-36; Hyoung-kyu Chey and Yu Wai Vic Li, “Chinese Domestic Politics and the Internationalization of the Renminbi,” Political Science Quarterly 135 no. 1 (2020): 37-65.
(29) Roberts, “Avoid Allowing Opponents to ‘Beat America at its Own Game, ’”p. 149.
(30) Jonathan Cheng, “China Rolls out Pilot Test of Digital Currency,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020; “What is China's Digital Currency Plan?”Financial Times, November 25, 2019.
(31) Nikkei Asian Review, May 20, 2019.
(32) “Russia Says BRICS Nations Favor Idea of Common Payment System,” Moscow Times, November 14, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/14/putin-to-invite-china-and-india-to-join-anti-sanctions-bank-network-a68172.
(33) Eric Helleiner and Hongying Wang, “Limits to the BRICS' Challenge: Credit Rating Reform and Institutional Innovation in Global Finance,” Review of International Political Economy 25 no. 5 (2018): 573-595.
(34) Thomas Philippon, The Great Reversal: How America Gave up on Free Markets (Belknap Press, 2019).