附录：南海辩论中英文实录

辩论一：王冠与美国专家瓦格纳关于“南海仲裁”的辩论
时间：2016年7月

中文翻译

今日俄罗斯美洲台《交叉辩论》主持人彼得·拉韦尔（以下简称“主持人”）：海牙国际仲裁法院已经做出压倒性的裁决，反对中国在南海的领土主张，中国不但拒绝接受这一裁决，甚至也拒绝参加“仲裁庭审”。现在就中国南海进行交叉辩论，我们请到了在华盛顿的王冠来参加，他是中国中央电视台北美分台的首席时政记者。还有来自纽约的丹尼尔·瓦格纳，他是美国国家风险方案公司的首席执行官。王冠，我先问问你对南海仲裁的管辖权、参与和执法的看法。许多人都有这个疑问。

中国中央电视台北美分台首席时政记者王冠（以下简称“王冠”）：彼得，如果我们先把西方主流媒体对“南海仲裁”的报道放到一边，去一章一章地仔细读一下《联合国海洋法公约》（简称“《公约》”），我们会发现，此案的本质是仲裁法院对一个自己没有管辖权的事情做出了“裁定”，而“裁定”的是一个由菲律宾对中国提起的、地缘政治味道十足的案子。让我来详细解释一下。《公约》第15部分第3节第298条规定：法院不能裁决主权问题。那么海牙仲裁法院是否对主权做出了裁决呢？从文字上看，没有。但实质上，却有。

让我们来看看吧。它“裁定”了中国的南海九段线。中国主张在断续线内对相关岛屿及其海域拥有主权。当你“裁定”那条线无效时，就等于把主权无效化了。所以它“裁决”了主权。此外，“仲裁”还判定了一些南海地貌的性质，判定了它们是礁还是岛。即便在太平岛和永兴岛上有餐厅、银行，甚至有互联网、无线（局域）网（Wi-Fi）和手机4G信号，仲裁法院还是“裁定”它们不是岛，因此不能享有12海里的领海主权。这是“裁决”了领土。最终那份“裁决”还“裁定”中国的填海造岛等行为非法，这也与领土和主权有关。简而言之，仲裁法院以“裁决”其他议题当幌子把主权问题给“裁定”了，它看似没有违反《公约》的法律文字，却违反了《公约》的法律精神。另外请容许我补充一下，《公约》第295条说争议各方应该在寻求仲裁解决前穷尽“当地救济措施”（比如双边谈判），而菲律宾并没有这样做。

美国国家风险方案公司首席执行官丹尼尔·瓦格纳（以下简称“丹尼尔·瓦格纳”）：我们可以大玩文字游戏，但最终发生的，是中国声称对南海的一大片区域拥有主权，而除中国外没有人同意这一点，这有点像其他国家说，你看我就是喜欢这一片水和这些岛屿，我觉得它们就应该是我的。至于寻求双边谈判，在这个问题上有许多国家也是声索国并寻求与中国展开双边谈判，但在这方面中国一直表现得不情不愿。我认为这次仲裁是国际法效力的证明，表明诸如菲律宾这样的小国可以用法律的方式对抗像中国这样的大国，并取得胜利。现在仲裁法院做出了这样的裁决，并不是因为这是大卫战胜了哥利亚，而是因为仲裁法院经过仔细研究，认为中方的观点是不合理的、站不住脚的，除了中国人自己，没人认可中国的观点。

王冠：事实上你说的是没有西方国家认可中国的观点。有中东、非洲和东欧等地好几十个国家支持中国。这些国家支持中国，是因为他们没有相信西方的叙事。在这个问题上，西方版本的叙事非常有意思。他们简单化地进行了有选择性的报道，似乎在南海的法律比拼中，菲律宾以1︰0战胜了中国，而中国却不遵守国际法。我不知道有多少西方编辑和记者仔细读过《公约》。如果他们读过了，他们会质疑自己得出这些结论的前提，比如：海牙常设仲裁法院对主权问题有没有司法管辖权？能不能绕着弯裁决主权？我也不知道有多少西方记者和编辑与不同于西方主流观点的法律学者深度交流过，或者在报道中引述过他们的观点。那些学者会指出，很多法律原则支持中方观点，例如“禁止反言”。这个概念的意思是，如果一个国家曾经承认他国的南海主权，比如20世纪70年代越南时任总理范文同就承认过中国南海主权，那么它就不能在几十年后反悔。我们在西方媒体上看不到这些观点。另外，西方媒体在这件事的报道上断章取义，仿佛中国突然开始向浩瀚的海洋里倾倒砂石、填海造陆。他们忘记了一个简单的事实，在“二战”之后，美国曾借军舰帮助中国收复南海岛屿，默认中国的南海主权声索。我们在西方媒体上没有看到任何类似的报道。所以说，是的，西方媒体是相对自由的，但自由的媒体也是有偏见的。是的，他们注明了每一处消息来源，但他们的来源是谁？他们多少次真心引述过非西方的消息源？是的，他们把带感情色彩的形容词都注明出处，但他们精心挑选和构建的名词呢？比如“共产主义中国” 或者 “具有法律约束力的仲裁”。这些看似客观的名词迎合和强化了西方观众的成见。

主持人：纽约的丹尼尔，看起来你想发言。你请讲。

丹尼尔·瓦格纳：我想问王冠几个问题，中国加入了《公约》，成为签署国之一。从1982年签署的那天起，《公约》就已成为一份法律文书，然而在很多场合中，中国一直在说，你看，其实我不喜欢这部分法律，我不喜欢那个裁定，所以我决定不遵守它。我想问的是，如果结果不是你想要的，你就不打算去遵守它，既然如此，签署公约还有什么意义？这是一个问题。

王冠：丹尼尔，国际法中有一个概念叫作“保留条款”。

主持人：丹尼尔，你继续。

丹尼尔·瓦格纳：让我先讲完我的观点。是的，但你们没有参加仲裁，你们甚至都没有在仲裁法院列席。另一个问题是专属经济区，它应该是一国向外延伸200海里。黄岩岛和美济礁，它们都位于距菲律宾海岸120海里处，而这些岛屿和中国最近的距离也有300海里，即海南岛南方的西沙群岛。所以，这些都不在中国的专属经济区范围内，但美济礁和黄岩岛显然在菲律宾的专属经济区内。中国全不理睬这些事实。如果这件事上，中国和菲律宾位置互换一下，我能想象中国肯定不会太高兴。

主持人：让王冠来回答一下这个问题。在华盛顿的王冠，请讲。

王冠：丹尼尔，如果按地理远近原则来裁定主权，那么想想北马里亚纳群岛或关岛吧，它们离西太平洋国家比离美国大陆似乎近了一点。还有，你提到中国为什么没有参加这次仲裁，这是因为国际法中有个原则叫“保留条款”。很多公约都有“保留条款”。中国以及其他30多个西方国家，如丹麦、阿根廷、英国都签署了这些“保留条款”。“保留条款”包括不允许仲裁法院对主权进行仲裁。这就是为什么中国从一开始就没有参加仲裁。而中国远不是第一个这样做的国家，西方国家已这么做了。

丹尼尔·瓦格纳：但遗憾的是，对中国来说面子上并不好看，因为这会被视为对国际法的藐视。我想补充最后一点，如果裁决有利于中国，我觉得它的政府会赞扬裁决结果，赞美这个机构及其智慧，而不是彻底地批评。这有点像熊孩子的表现。

主持人：可这就是政治啊。

王冠：当越南1976年在南沙群岛建选第一条机场跑道时，美国并没有跳出来批评越南，当菲律宾两年后在南沙群岛填海造陆时，美国也没有跳出来批评菲律宾。后来，当菲律宾把一艘老军舰停在仁爱礁不走的时候，美国还是没有跳出来指责盟友菲律宾。奥巴马总统甚至在今年3月接受《大西洋月刊》专访时，明确承认了（美国）对中国的遏制战略。我在这里一字不差地引述他的原话：“如果你看看我们是如何在中国南海进行操作，你就知道我们已经能够调动大部分亚洲国家，通过让中国十分惊讶的方式来孤立中国，坦白地说，这加强了我们与盟国的关系 ，对美国十分有利。”所以说，美国其实是通过政治手段、军事部署并利用国际法来搞地缘政治。如果这还不是勾结起来对付中国，那我不知道什么才是。

丹尼尔·瓦格纳：即便如此，这次（南海仲裁）也与美国无关，这最终与中国希望被视为怎样的国家有关，与中国想被世界视为什么样的大国有关。（中国）单方面采取行动，并认为这个裁决结果早就内定了，这不符合全球领导者的身份。中国单方面地（在南海）建立了一个事实上的军事基地，然后声称它属于中国，然后说反对其他国家的种种行为，这有点荒唐。

王冠：美国真的需要一个新的对华战略了。他们利用保护海上通道和贸易为借口遏制中国。如果你看看数据，中国与东盟国家的贸易进行得相当好。中国作为世界上最大的贸易国，每年通过南海进行的贸易总额为5万亿美元。如果美国“重返亚太”的重点是安全原因，那么究竟是什么安全原因呢？是朝鲜吗？可是朝鲜一直没能成为真正的威胁。是恐怖主义吗？可是极端组织“伊斯兰国”（IS）和塔利班在地球的另一端。是核不扩散？可是大部分核弹头都在东欧和西欧国家……

主持人：好的，先生们。王，我必须打断一下。你提出了一些我们无法立即回答的重要问题。非常感谢我们在华盛顿和纽约的嘉宾。感谢收看“今日俄罗斯”节目的观众，下次再见！请记住精彩尽在《交叉辩论》。

英文原文

Peter Lavelle, CrossTalk host at RT America：An International tribunal in the Hague has ruled overwhelmingly against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing not only rejects this ruling. It even refused to participate in the case.

To cross talk South China Sea, I am joined by Wang Guan in Washington. He is the chief political correspondent at CCTV America and in New York, we cross to Daniel Wagner. He is the CEO for Country Risk Solutions. Wang, if I can go to you first here. The issues of jurisdiction, participation and enforcement are all called into question by many people here.

Wang Guan, Chief Political Correspondent of CCTV America：Well Peter, if we forget about western mainstream press for a moment and look at UNCLOS chapter for chapter, we can see that this case, in its essence, is about a court that ruled on something it has no jurisdiction to rule on, based on a geopoliticized lawsuit filed by the Philippines against China. I will explain exactly what I mean. In Part 15, Section 3 and Article 298 of UNCLOS, it says a court does not have jurisdiction to rule on sovereignty. And did the court in the Hague rule on sovereignty? Well, in letter it did not but in spirit it did.

Let’s look at it. It ruled on nine-dash line, a claim by Beijing that it has some specific controls of the islands and their associated territorial waters. When you delegitimize that line, you delegitimize the sovereignty. So it is about sovereignty. Also it ruled on the land features, whether they are rocks or islands. Well, despite the fact that in Taiping Island and Yongxing Island, we have restaurants, banks, even internet, Wi-Fi and cellphone LTE signals, the court ruled that they are not islands so they can not confer 12-nautical mile territorial water. It is about territory. And eventually, also it ruled that China’s land reclamation is illegal which had something to do with territory and sovereignty. So the court, in a nutshell, ruled on sovereignty in the disguise of ruling on other things which violated the spirit, if not the letter of UNCLOS. Also if I may add, article 295 of UNCLOS said parties to a dispute should exhaust “local remedies”, meaning bilateral negotiations, before a party goes to the court and the Philippines did not do that.

Daniel Wagner, CEO of Country Risk Solutions：We can talk about word-smithing all we want. At the end of the day, what’s happening is China is claiming sovereignty over an enormous swaths of the South China Sea and no one but China agrees with it. It would be a bit like any other country saying you know I just like those bits of water and those islands and I think I will claim them for myself. In terms of seeking local remedies, well, many of the countries that are also party to this issue have sought local remedy with China but China has not been very forthcoming in that regard. I think it is a testament to the power of international law that small countries like the Philippines can take on the Goliath like China in this manner and prevail. Now the court ruled the way that it did not because it’s David against Goliath, the court ruled because it took a very close at the issues and it said this is unreasonable and it does not stand and no one besides China agrees.

Wang Guan：In fact, no western country supported China’s point of view. There are dozens of countries that supported China across the middle east, Africa and Eastern Europe. Those countries support China because they are not sold with the western narrative of the issue. Western narrative of the issue is very interesting in that they framed the issue very simplistically as if the Philippines 1 China 0 and China is not willing to abide by international laws. But I am not sure how many western editors and reporters read UNCLOS chapter for chapter or word for word, and then if they did, they would question the premise of their argument. That is, whether or not the arbitration court, the PCA, has the jurisdiction to, indirectly, rule on sovereignty in the first place. Also I am not sure how many western reporters and editors really talked to legal scholars from the other side and quoted them. Those scholars would point out that many legal principles actually supported Beijing’s point of view, such as Estoppel. Meaning if a country like Vietnam did in the 70s, once recognized China’s claim, as their Prime Minister Pham Van Dong did, they are not supposed to recant or withdraw their arguments decades later. We don’t see that in the western press. Also the western press framed the issue without context as if China started dumping sands and gravels in the middle of the ocean out of nowhere. They forgot the simple fact Ameria once sent naval vessels to help China claim those islands after WWII and once tacitly recognized China’s claims. We don’t see any of that. So yes, the western press are relatively free but free press have biases. Yes， they attribute each and every one of their sources. But who are their sources? How many non-western sources do they take seriously? Yes, they attribute each and every one of their adjectives, but how about their carefully-crafted nouns, such as Communist China or legallybinding arbitration. Those nouns really reinforce and feed into the stereotypes of the western audience.

Peter Lavelle：Daniel, looked like you wanted to jump in in New York. Go ahead.

Daniel Wagner：Well, I’d like to ask Wang to respond to a couple of issues. One is there are a number of instances where China has basically joined a legal regime UNCLOS being one of them and it has signed on the very day in 1982 when it became a legal instrument. And yet there’s been numerous instances where China has said you know I don’t actually like that portion of the law. I don’t like that ruling. So I am not gonna abide by it. So I would ask what is the point of signing on to the law if you don’t intend to abide by it when it doesn’t go the way you want it to go. That’s one issue.

Wang Guan：Well, Daniel, there is such a thing as reservations to a treaty.

Peter Lavelle ：Go ahead Daniel.

Daniel Wagner：Let me just finish my point. Yes， but you are not even showing up at this party. You are not even party to this particular issue in this court. The other issue is exclusive economic zones. That is supposed to go out 200 nautical miles. The Scarborough Shoal, the Mischief Reef, they are 120 miles from the Philippine coast, the closest of any of these islands in the South China Sea to China is almost 300 miles. The Paracel islands from the Hainan island in the South. So none of these are within China’s exclusive economic zone yet Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal are clearly in the Philippines’exclusive economic zone. It doesn’t seem to matter to China. But if this was done to China and the roles were reversed, I can imagine they wouldn’t be very happy.

Peter Lavelle：Let’s try to get Wang to respond to that. Wang in Washington.

Wang Guan：Well, Daniel, if geographical proximity is the rule, think about the Northern Mariana Islands or Guam. They are a little closer to the countries in the Western Pacific than to the continental United States. Also when you raised the point of why China did not attend this arbitration. It is because there is such a thing in international law called reservations. There are all reservations to treaties. China, along with some 30 other western countries, Denmark, Argentina, the UK, signed this reservation saying that it does not allow the court to rule on sovereignty. That’s why China did not attend the arbitration in the first place. China is hardly the first country to do that. It has companies in the west.

Daniel Wagner：And unfortunately, for China, China is not gonna look very good. Because it’s gonna be perceived as thumbing its nose at international law. I would add one last thing, which is, if this ruling had come out in favor of China. I suspect that the government would be praising it and praising the body and all of its wisdom instead of criticizing it outright and just sort of more or less acting like an intransigent child.

Peter Lavelle：That’s how politics works, okay.

Wang Guan：When Vietnam built the first airstrip in the Spratly Islands in 1976, Washington wasn’t too eager to jump to criticism of Vietnam. When the Philippines did it two years later by reclaiming some islands in the Spratleys, Washington didn’t jump to criticism of the Philippines and also when the Philippines grounded an old naval vessel in the Second Thomas Shoal or Ren’ai Jiao, Washington again did not jump to criticism of its ally the Philippines. President Obama even explicitly admitted the containment strategies (of China) in an interview with The Atlantic this March. He said and I quote, word for word, “if you look at how we’ve operated in the South China Sea,we have been able to mobilize most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised China and frankly have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances.” So in using politics, military deployment and international law, those issues. If this is not ganging up against China, I don’t know what is.

Daniel Wagner：It is really not about the US though. It is really ultimately about what kind of country China wants to be perceived as, what kind of global leader it wants to be perceived as in the global community. And the idea of unilaterally taking action and calling it a fait accompli is inconsistent with being a top leader at the table. To unilaterally go and to create a de facto military base and claim it as your own and say what are you objecting to, that doesn’t really make any sense.

Wang Guan：The US really needs a new strategic posture on China. Because they use excuses such as protecting the sea lanes and trade but if you look at those facts, China and the ASEAN countries traded quite alright. As the largest trading nation in the world, as China is, 5 trillion dollar’s worth of trade going through South China Sea every year. And also if Asia Pivot is about security issue, what exactly are those security issues? On North Korea？Well, North Korea has not been able to pull off a real existential threat. On terrorism？IS and the Taliban are half a world away. If on non-proliferation？Most of the nuclear warheads are in eastern Europe and western Europe.

Peter Lavelle：Okay gentlemen. Wang, I have to jump in here. You raised some very important questions we can’t answer right now. Many thanks for our guests in Washington and in New York. And thanks to our viewers for watching us here on RT. See you next time and remember CrossTalk rules.

辩论二：王冠与哈佛学者韦茨就美军穿越南海的辩论
时间：2015年12月

中文翻译

今日俄罗斯美洲台主持人彼得·拉韦尔（以下简称“主持人”）：大家好，欢迎来到《交叉辩论》，在这里我们无所不谈。我是彼得·拉韦尔。今天我们聚焦中国，以及亚太掀起的势力版图重新划分浪潮。过去几周中美上演了“比谁胆大游戏”（原文play chicken，即开车对撞看谁先躲）。两国战略博弈再起。中美间合作与对抗的循环会周而复始吗？今天来讨论中美海上对峙的嘉宾包括理查德·韦茨，他是美国哈德森研究所政治与军事中心主任，高级研究员。同样在华盛顿，我们请来了王冠，他是中国中央电视台北美分台首席时政记者。《交叉辩论》的规则是，大家随时可以插话，我也鼓励大家这样做。王冠，先从你开始吧。最近中美之间都有很多言辞，中国警告美国要尊重中国主权和国家安全。同时，美国说他们的海军有权去任何地方行使自由航行权，中国无法阻拦。两个大国，两个强国，两个利益发生冲突的国家，接下来会发生什么？

中国中央电视台北美分台首席时政记者王冠（以下简称“王冠”）：彼得，我觉得美国驶入南海是搞地缘政治多于原则性政策。让我们面对这个问题吧：美国利用国际法，也就是《联合国海洋法公约》，一个美国自己都没有签署的条约，来推进自己的地缘政治利益。让我具体解释一下：美国军方说驶入南海是行使航行自由权。如果真的如此，美国应该客观公正地行使这一权利。而实际上，美国海军前往的地点都是精心挑选的。我们来看看：目前放眼全世界，有近100个主权存在争端的岛屿。美国海军为什么不去南大西洋的英称福克兰群岛，即阿根廷所称的马尔维纳斯群岛呢？阿根廷一直对英国在那里的主权提出挑战。美国海军为什么不去地中海上西班牙控制的几个岛屿呢？摩洛哥对那些岛屿的主权也正提出挑战。美国海军倒是去了黑海，而且是在俄罗斯去年收复克里米亚之际，如今美国海军又来到了南海。其次，美国军方说巡航南海的目的是保证航道通畅，确保贸易能够自由流通。可是，南海上的贸易一直在自由流通着，这就是为什么每年有5万亿美元的贸易经过南海，这也就是为什么全球有50%的海上石油运输经过南海。中国没有阻碍或破坏这些贸易航道。

哈佛学者，美国哈德森研究所高级研究员理查德·韦茨（以下简称“理查德·韦茨”）：不，中国没有那样的意图，但中国目前的行为可能会造成那样的后果。这是大家所担心的。目前，在美国良性霸权下，这些南海上的贸易航道畅通，太平洋上也没有什么冲突，几乎没有，该区域创造了大量财富。但出于一些原因，中国正试图改变这样的现状和规则，它希望自己的崛起大国的地位被接纳。中国可能会无意中破坏现存的亚太秩序格局，中国创建的新秩序格局可能不如以前的有效。如果中国开始（在南海）建造人工岛礁，那会将矛盾激化，商船会因此犹豫是否还要经行那里。我想中国没有阻碍航运的意图，但中国在南海的活动可能客观上会造成这样的后果，扰乱（南海）重要的运输航道。

王冠：美国常嘲讽中国谈南海的历史性主权。他们常说，中国人就爱扯历史。事实是，所有国家当今享有的主权领土都植根于历史，包括美国。我们不要忘了，正是在1893年，美国外交官约翰·史蒂文斯发动政变推翻了夏威夷王国，才使其后来成为美国的一个州。在1898年美西战争后，美国占据了波多黎各和关岛。1889年，美国发动军事行动占领了如今的美属萨摩亚。如果中国忽略这些史实，或者俄罗斯忽略这些史实，并派军舰到这些岛屿12海里海域巡航，美国会做何感受呢？

主持人：你是否也觉得目前最大的问题是中国和美国都坚持自己的思维定式和习惯，他们都认为自己是正确的，认为对方应该做出调整。这样下去大家会遇到麻烦，因为这种思维将导致冲突而不是沟通。

理查德·韦茨：我想这是一部分原因。另外中美想要的东西也不一样。中国曾表示希望同美国划分太平洋势力范围。中国曾说我们在西太平洋，给你们东太平洋，然后问题就解决了。但问题是，西太平洋的这些国家，有日本、菲律宾，还有其他国家和地区，这些国家和地区不想加入中国的势力范围。他们希望找到平衡，他们不希望同中国发生冲突，他们也不希望被划入美国的势力范围。他们希望游离在中间，同中美两国都有好的政治和军事关系。问题是中国正在改变。如今你听不到中国说，好吧，来谈判吧。现在我们只会听到刚才所听到的观点，那就是那些（南海）岛屿自古属于我们（中国），我们会管辖它们，我们有权建军事设施，这是我们的地盘。

王冠：我觉得问题的关键是，美国认为必须通过重返亚洲来遏制中国，过去70年，美国国内一直把中国描绘成一个邪恶的共产主义国家。对共产主义的恐惧在过去很长时间内影响着美国的对华政策。因为外交政策也源于意识形态和思想。想想吧，20世纪50年代美国国内的麦卡锡主义和肯尼迪总统的多米诺理论都是在传播共产主义国家如何恐怖。这种意识形态仍然在影响着今天的美国外交政策。中国被描述和塑造成了一个富有侵略性的共产主义国家，这就为美国遏制中国提供了理由。这就是美国当今外交政策的暗流。我觉得这种思想是不准确的。在外交政策上，中国不是一个富有侵略性的国家。你能想出中国在海外建立了哪块殖民地吗？过去40年，中国打过一场仗，美国打了多少场？

主持人：打了不少。理查德，我们节目时间快到了，从过去的事态推测，我们觉得美国不会真想和别人发生冲突，但同时它的确想重返亚太。

理查德·韦茨：我要澄清关于美国的重返亚太。与其说美国增加在亚太的军事部署，不如说美国在世界其他地区缩减部署，这样在亚太的军事比例就增加了。中国是个不太寻常的大国。过去德国和日本崛起的时候，它们很激进地改变当时的国际秩序，使其符合自身利益。中国目前还没有这样做。但有一种顾虑是，中国比之前要果敢得多，而且不愿意退让，越过了很多（美国认为的）红线。

主持人：好的,理查德，节目时间到了。先生们，我们节目时间到了，很精彩的对话。谢谢我们华盛顿的嘉宾。谢谢收看“今日俄罗斯”的观众。别忘了精彩尽在《交叉辩论》，下次节目再会。

英文原文

Peter Lavelle, Host of RT America：Hello and welcome to CrossTalk, where all things are considered. I’m Peter Lavelle. The most recent China Wave on the remaking of the pacific. Over the last weeks, Beijing and Washington have upped the ante in their game of play chicken to determine who will have sway and influence. Do China and the US face nearly endless trials between accommodation and confrontation? To cross talk conflicting claims in the pacific, I’m joined by my guests, Richard Weitz, he is a senior fellow in director of the Center for political and military analysis in the Hudson Institute. Also in Washington, we have Wang Guan, he is the chief political correspondent at CCTV America. So in general cross talk rules, the fact means you can jump in any time you want and I very much encourage it. Guan, if I can go to you first in Washington D.C...A lot of words coming out of Beijing and Washington over the last couple of weeks, the Chinese are warning the Americans to respect China’s sovereignty and national security. At the same time, the Americans are saying they are going to sail and they are going to fly anywhere they want and China can’t do anything about it. Uh, two big countries, two great countries, two powerful countries at crossed purposes, where are we going with this?

Wang Guan, Chief Political Correspondent of CCTV America：Well Peter, I think this is more geopolitics than policy. I mean, let’s face it. America is using international law, namely the UN convention on the law of the sea, which by the way, the US didn’t even sign or ratify to advance, really, its geopolitical interests. Here’s what I mean, the US, the Pentagon is saying that it’s exercising freedom of navigation. But if so, navigation exercises should be conducted in a fair and objective manner. But the destinations are highly selective. Let’s look at it：there are around 100 disputed islands in the world today. Why didn’t the US navy send fleets to the Falkland Island, or Malvinas, which is controlled by the UK and contended by Argentina? Or why didn’t the US Navy go to the Mediterranean where a bunch of islands were controlled by Spain but contended by Morocco? Where the US Navy did go was places like the Black Sea, when Russia regained Crimea last year and now to South China Sea. And secondly, Pentagon is arguing that well, it is making sure that the sea lanes are open so trade can flow freely. Well, the trade in South China Sea has always been flowing freely. I mean that’s why 5 trillion dollar trade is going through South China Sea every year and 50% of global oil shipments going through that area. China didn’t do anything to hinder or hamper that process.

Richard Weitz, Harvard Scholar, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute：No, there’s no thinking that China has that intent but that could be the result if, you know, present trends continue. That’s the worry. So far, under benign American hegemony or whatever you’re gonna call it, these trade zones have stayed open, there’s been no conflicts in the Pacific, it’s very rare, have a lot of prosperity and the concern now is that for reasons we’ll probably be discussed soon, China’s trying to change rules, accommodate itself as a rising great power and in the process, they could inadvertently disrupt the existing pattern but not create something as effective as is in place. So if you start building artificial islands, you start exasperating the disputes. Then shippers will likely not to use that, I mean, you can just imagine even, I’m sure it’s not China’s intent but just the result could be disrupting those vital sea lines.

Wang Guan：America always ridiculed and teased about China’s historical claims on those islands in South China Sea and they think that, oh, the Chinese talk about history too much. Well, here’s the thing, all countries have historical basis to claim the areas, the territories they claim today, including the United States. Let’s think about it. Let’s not forget, in 1893, US diplomat John Stevens helped overthrow the Kingdom of Hawaii and incorporated it as a state and in 1898, after the US-Spanish war, the US got Puerto Rico and Guam from Spain and then in 1889, the US threw a military operation and occupied the American Samoa. If China ignores those historical basis on sovereignty, or Russia, and sends fleets to within 12 nautical miles of those islands, how would America think and feel?

Peter Lavelle：Do you think really one of the biggest problems is that the same mind-sets and habits of Washington and Beijing, I mean they both see themselves as being in the correct, in the right and the other one has to adjust to the other and this is where we’re getting a trouble because that’s a recipe for conflict and not for negotiation.

Richard Weitz：I’d imagine that’s part of it but of course, what they want is different. In fact, the Chinese have indicated they were open to some kind of sphere of influence agreement. They said you know, we will have the western Pacific and you guys can have the eastern pacific and then that will solve the problem. But the problem is the countries that would fall in that, that area, Japan, the Philippines, others don’t really want to be part of the Chinese sphere of influence. They kinda like a balance, they don’t wanna get into conflict with China, they don’t wanna be in American sphere of influence. They kinda like it where they can be in the middle and benefit from good political and military relations in the economic relations of both. I mean the thing is China’s changing, that’s the problem. You don’t hear about well, no, let’s make a deal, and it’s more basically what we just heard, it’s you know, these are ancient time territories, they belong to us, we will reserve them open for everybody, won’t militarize them, they belong to us.

Wang Guan：The gist of the problem is, US thinks that it must return to Asia to contain China because over the past 70 years, the message, the story of China being this evil, communist country has been really selling. This communist China fear mongering was behind the US policies because after all, all policies originated from ideology and ideas. If you think about the 60s when, in the 50s, the McCarthyism to President Kennedy’s domino effects theory about communism fear mongering all the way to the present day. Those ideology still affects US foreign policy. That painted and framed China as this aggressive communist country that the US has to contain, has to do something about. That is really the undercurrent of the current US foreign policy and we believe that is false. But externally, China is not an aggressivecountry. When can you think of a country, can you think of one overseas colony China established. In 40 years, China fought one war. How many did the US fight?

Peter Lavelle：Quite a few there. Richard, we are rapidly running out of time here. I want to go back to this kind of precedent there. I don’t think the US want to go to a shooting war with anybody in the Pacific OK? But at the same time it does have this pivot here.

Richard Weitz：Yes, just to clarify with the pivot or technically called the Re-balance to Asia, it is less that the US is increasing its military strength in the pacific, than it’s cutting back every where else. So the percentage of forces left in the pacific is rising but I would agree with the previous point that China is being unusually. Normally when a great power rises, think of Germany, Japan or others, then are wiling to go much more aggressive to restructure the international system in a way that they want. China has not done that so far but there are some concern that this new leadership is a lot more assertive and less willing to make compromise, and is crossing a lot of red lines that we haven’t seen before.

Peter Lavelle：OK Richard, on that point there, gentlemen, we are running out of time. Fascinating discussion. Many thanks to my guests in Washington. And thanks to our viewers for watching us on RT. Until next time, remember, CrossTalk rules.

[1]https://support.google.com/googlenews/answer/9005749?hl=en

[2]https://www.computerworld.com/article/2495365/business-intelligence/an-inside-look-atgoogle-s-news-ranking-algorithm.html

[3]https://www.blog.google/products/news/new-google-news-ai-meets-human-intelligence/

[4]另外需要说明，本书论述的数据支持，并非全部来自严格的实证分析。受到工作与生活情境的限制（当然，或许有时也得益于此），我的论述参考了过去10年个人的一线观察，统计也时常依靠便利抽样的原则。尽管如此，我相信，这些研究还是可以探测到美国貌似繁荣且自由的大众传播背后“看不见的手”。我将热诚期待读者对我的写作提出批评与建议，它们都将成为我下一步更细致工作的开端。