国际政治科学(2013年第2期/总第34期)
上QQ阅读APP看书,第一时间看更新

五、研究结论

本文依据简化的博弈模型深入分析了“狐假虎威”现象,清楚地揭示了参与博弈的三类国家行为体之间复杂的互动关系,成功辨识出同盟外部国家有效威慑同盟内部弱国挑战的充分必要条件。研究发现,同盟外部国家要实现成功威慑同盟内部弱国挑战的目标,需要满足两项基本条件。第一,同盟外部国家必须具备威慑实力,即所拥有的威慑性威胁在实施后能够给同盟内部弱国的利益造成重大损失,确保同盟内部国家认识到维持现状要优于和同盟外部国家发生冲突。第二,同盟外部国家的威慑决心必须高于某一门槛值,当同盟内部弱国为有决心类型(H类型)时,门槛值用c1t表示;当同盟内部弱国为无决心类型(S类型)时,门槛值用c2t表示。由于三方不对称威慑博弈还存在一个不确定威慑均衡,当同盟外部国家的威慑决心较低,也有可能威慑成功,不过这种成功是不稳定的,因为不确定威慑均衡存在的条件与攻击均衡和虚张声势均衡的存在条件存在交集。从c1tc2t两个门槛值的函数特征可以发现,随着盟内强国庇护或支持力度的增大,盟外国家成功威慑盟内弱国挑战的决心门槛值上升,也就是说盟内弱国的挑衅性上升,这清楚地反映了“狐假虎威”效应。观察两个有关威慑决心的门槛值,还可以发现几个有价值的推论:在其他条件不变的情况下,当现状对盟内弱国而言具有更大的价值时,即挑战者的现状满意度越高,其挑衅性会下降;当冲突或战争成本对盟内弱国来说变大时,盟外国家更容易威慑成功;当挑战获胜得到的利益对盟内弱国而言变大时,盟外国家的威慑更容易失败;当让步对盟内弱国来说具有更高的成本时,盟外国家的威慑更容易成功。


[1] Erich Weede,“Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.27,No.2,1983,pp.231-254;John J. Mearsheimer,“Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,”International Security,Vol.9,No.3,1984/1985,pp.19-46;Janice Gross Stein,“Extended Deterrence in the Middle East:American Strategy Reconsidered,”World Politics,Vol.39,No.3,1987,pp.326-352;Paul K. Huth,“Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,”American Political Science Review,Vol.82,No.2,1988,pp.423-443;Bruce Martin Russett,“Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons:How Necessary,How Acceptable?”The Review of Politics,Vol.50,No.2,1988,pp.282-302;Erich Weede,“Extended Deterrence,Superpower Control,and Militarized Interstate Disputes,1962-1976,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.26,No.1,1989,pp.7-17;Fred Chernoff,“Stability and Alliance Cohesion:The Effects of Strategic Arms Reductions on Targeting and Extended Deterrence,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol. 34,No.1,1990,pp.92-101;Samuel S. G. Wu,“To Attack or Not to Attack:A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.34,No.3,1990,pp.531-552.

[2] D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare,“Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence,”Synthese,Vol.100,No.3,1994,pp.379-412;Alastair Smith,“Extended Deterrence and Alliance Formation,”International Interactions,Vol.24,No.4,1998,pp.315-343;Vesna Danilovic,“The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.3,2001,pp.341-369;Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour,“Alignment Patterns,Crisis Bargaining,and Extended Deterrence:A Game-Theoretic Analysis,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.47,No.4,2003,pp.587-615;Curtis S.Signorino and Ahmer Tarar,“A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.50,No.3,2006,pp.586-605;Stephen L. Quackenbush,“Not Only Whether but Whom:Three-Party Extended Deterrence,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.50,No.4,2006,pp.562-583;Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour,“The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence:Explaining British Policy in 1914,”International Studies Review,Vol.8,No.4,2006,pp.623-641;Andrew O’Neil,“Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia:redundant or resurgent?”International Affairs,Vol.87,No.6,2011,pp. 1439-1457.

[3] Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour,“The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence:Explaining British Policy in 1914,”pp.623-641.

[4] 有关一般威慑和即时威慑的区别可参见:Patrick M. Morgan,Deterrence:A Conceptual Analysis(Beverly Hills,CA:Sage,1983),p.30;Vesna Danilovic,“Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.45,No.1,2001,pp.100-102;Vesna Danilovic,When the Stakes Are High:Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers(Ann Arbor:The University of Michigan Press,2002),pp.54-55;Stephen L. Quackenbush,“Deterrence Theory:Where Do We Stand?”Review of International Studies,Vol.37,No.2,2011,pp.741-762。

[5] William W. Kaufmann,The Requirements of Deterrence(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1954);Bernard Brodie,“The Anatomy of Deterrence,”World Politics,Vol.11,No.2,1959,pp.173-179;Glenn H. Snyder,Deterrence and Defense:Toward a Theory of National Security(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1961);Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito,“Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.28,No.1,1984,pp.63-84;Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito,The Stability of Mutual Deterrence,in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare,eds.,Exploring the Stability of Deterrence(Boulder:Lynne Rienner,1987),pp. 13-39;John J. Mearsheimer,“Back to the Future:Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”International Security,Vol.15,No.1,1990,pp.5-56.表达结构威慑理论主要观点的一个最好模型是Intriligator和Brito发展的导弹战正式模型,揭示了体系结构、战争成本和武器系统特征之间错综复杂的关系,有关这一模型的中文解释也可参见阎学通、阎梁:《国际关系分析》,北京大学出版社2008年版,第171页。

[6] Daniel Ellsberg,“The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choice,”American Economic Review,Vol.51,No.2,1961,pp.472-478;Herman Kahn,On Thermonuclear War(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1960);Thomas Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven:Yale University Press,1966).

[7] Nigel Howard,Paradoxes of Rationality:Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1971).

[8] Robert Powell,Nuclear Deterrence Theory:The Search for Credibility(New York:Cambridge University Press,1990).

[9] Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour,Perfect Deterrence(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2000).

[10] James D.Fearon,“Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests:An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.38,No.2,1994,pp.236-269;“Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,”American Political Science Review,Vol.88,No.3,1994,pp.577-592.

[11] 罗杰·B.迈尔森:《博弈论:矛盾冲突分析》(于寅、费剑平译),北京,中国经济出版社2001年版,第1页。

[12] Thomas C. Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven,CT:Yale University Press,1966),p.7.

[13] Frank C. Zagare,“Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence:A Re-Examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory,”Journal of Theoretical Politics,Vol.16,No.2,2004,p.124.

[14] 本文使用“>Ch,>Def,>Pro”分别表示挑战者、威慑者和庇护者对两个不同结果之间的严格偏好关系。

[15] Richard Smoke,National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma(Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,1987),p.93.

[16] Richard K. Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance(Washington,D.C.:Brookings,1987),p.12.

[17] Richard Ned Lebow,Between Peace and War:The Nature of International Crisis(Baltimore,MD:The Johns Hopkins University Press,1981),p.15.

[18] Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour,Perfect Deterrence,pp.66-69.

[19] Reinhard Selten,“A Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,”International Journal of Game Theory,Vol.4,1975,pp.25-55.

[20] 涂志勇:《博弈论》,北京大学出版社2009版,第51页。

[21] 谢识予编著:《经济博弈论》(第三版),上海,复旦大学出版社2002年版,第119页。

[22] John C. Harsanyi,“Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players,”Management Science,Vol.14,1967/1968,pp.159-182,320-334,486-502.

[23] 除了c1tc2tqHtqSt四个重要的参数外,表3中其他几个参数的表达公式如下:

[24] pHminDef=(cCS-cSQ)(cCS-cHBW),pHmaxDef=(cCS-cSQ)(cCS-cHTW),pSminDef=(cCS-cSQ)(cCS-cCD),pSmaxDef=(cCS-cSQ)(cCS-cSTW).

[25] Faten Ghosn,“Glenn Palmer and Stuart A. Bremer,The MID3 Data Set,1993-2001:Procedures,Coding Rules,and Description,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.21,No.2,2004,pp.133-154.

[26] Daniel M. Jones,et al.,“Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816-1992:Rationale,Coding Rules,and Empirical Patterns,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.15,No.2,1996,pp.170-174.

[27] Daniel M. Jones,et al.,“Militarized Interstate Disputes,1816-1992:Rationale,Coding Rules,and Empirical Patterns,”p.180.

[28] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,The War Trap(New Haven:Yale University Press,1981).

[29] 肯德尔相关系数是以Maurice Kendall命名的,并经常用希腊字母τ(tau)表示其值。肯德尔相关系数是一个用来测量两个随机变量相关性的统计值。肯德尔相关系数的取值范围在-1到1之间,当τ为1时,表示两个随机变量拥有一致的等级相关性;当τ为-1时,表示两个随机变量拥有完全相反的等级相关性;当τ为0时,表示两个随机变量是相互独立的。

[30] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,“The War Trap Revisited:A Revised Expected Utility Model,”The American Political Science Review,Vol.79,No.1,1985,pp.156-177.

[31] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman,War and Reason:Domestic and International Imperatives(New Haven:Yale University Press,1992).

[32] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman,War and Reason:Domestic and International Imperatives,p. 47.

[33] Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter,“Tau-b or Not Tau-b:Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.43,No.1,1999,pp.123.

[34] D. Scott Bennett and Matthew C. Rupert,“Comparing Measures of Political Similarity:An Empirical Comparison of S versus τb in the Study of International Conflict,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.47,No.3,2003,pp.367-393.

[35] J. David Singer,Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey,“Capability Distribution,Uncertainty,and Major Power War,1820-1965,”in Bruce Russett,ed.,Peace,War,and Numbers(Beverly Hills:Sage,1972),pp.19-48;J. David Singer,“Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States,1816-1985,”International Interactions,Vol.14,No.2,1987,pp.115-132.

[36] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,The War Trap,p.105.

[37] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman,War and Reason:Domestic and International Imperatives,p.297.

[38] Stephen L.Quackenbush,“General Deterrence and International Conflict:Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,”International Interactions,Vol.36,No.1,2010,p.85.

[39] Stephen L.Quackenbush,“General Deterrence and International Conflict:Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,”p.84;相关附录的网址为http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/。

[40] Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,“How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.39,No.1,1995,pp.51-65.

[41] Stephen L.Quackenbush,“General Deterrence and International Conflict:Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,”p.85.

[42] 斯蒂芬·范埃弗拉:《政治学研究方法指南》(陈琪译),北京大学出版社2006年版,第48—50页。

[43] 阎学通、孙学峰:《国际关系研究实用方法》(第二版),北京,人民出版社2007年版,第106页。

[44] 郭明主编:《中越关系演变四十年》,南宁,广西人民出版社1992年版,第112—113页。

[45] 阎学通等著:《中外关系鉴览1950—2005:中国与大国关系定量衡量》,北京,高等教育出版社2010年版,第389页。

[46] 在7次因外交政策分歧而引发军事冲突中,有关中国外交抗议行为可以参见每次冲突发生后一段时间内的《人民日报》。其中1978年4月至1979年3月的中越冲突期间,中国针对越南在两国边境地区实施的挑衅行为而进行的外交抗议高达20多次;其余几次冲突分别参见《人民日报》(1981年5月6日,1983年4月11日,1985年1月11日,1987年10月6日等)。

[47] D. Scott Bennettand Allan Stam,“EUGene:A Conceptual Manual,”International Interactions,Vol.26,No.2,2000,pp.179-204,网址为http://eugenesoftware.org。