第62章

It may happen that the point in which another man surpasses me is a point of some importance to my welfare or convenience. I want， for example， to sink a well. It may happen that I have not the leisure or the means to acquire the science necessary for this purpose. Upon that supposition， I am not to be blamed if I employ a builder for the first or a mechanic for the second； nor shall I be liable if I work in person under his direction.

This sort of obedience is distinguished by the appellation of confidence；Chapter nd to justify， in a moral view， the reposing of confidence， the only thing necessary is that it should be fitter and more beneficial， all things considered， that the function to be performed should be performed by me.

The third and last kind of obedience necessary to be adverted to upon the present occasion is where I do that which is not prescribed to me by my private judgement， merely on account of the mischievous consequences that I foresee will be annexed to my omission by the arbitrary interference of some voluntary being.

The most important observation that arises upon the statement of scale of obedience in the second degree ought to be guarded with as much jealousy， and kept to the person yielding obedience within as narrow limits as possible.

The last sort of obedience will frequently be necessary. Voluntary beings constitute a large portion of the universe； we shall often have occasion to foresee their arbitrary determinations and conduct， nor can knowledge， as such， in any instance fail to be a desirable acquisition； our conduct therefore must and ought to be modified by their interferences. Morality， as has already been frequently observed， consists entirely in an estimate of consequences； he is the truly virtuous man who produces the greatest portion of benefit his situation will admit. The most exalted morality indeed， that in which the heart reposes with the most unmingled satisfaction， relates to the inherent and indefeasible tendencies of actions. But we shall be by no means excusable if we overlook， in our system of conduct， the arbitrary awards of other men. Nothing can be more certain than that an action， suppose of inferior moment or utility， which for its own sake might be right to be performed， it may become my duty to neglect if I know that by performing it I shall incur the penalty of death.

The mischiefs attendant on the frequent recurrence of this species of obedience， and the grounds upon which its interference is to be guarded against， as extensively as circumstances will admit， have already been stated. Yet obedience flowing from the consideration of a penalty is less a source of degradation and depravity than a habit of obedience founded in confidence. The man who yields it may reserve， in its most essential sense， his independence. He may be informed in judgement， and resolved in purpose， as to every moral and social obligation. He may suffer his understanding neither to be seduced nor confounded； he may observe， in its fullest extent， the mistake and prepossession of his neighbour， to which he thus finds it necessary to accommodate himself. It seems possible that he who thus pities the folly， while he complies with the necessity， may still， even under this discipline， grow in discrimination and sagacity.

The greatest mischief that can arise in the progress of obedience is， where it shall lead us， in any degree， to depart from the independence of our understanding， a departure general and unlimited confidence necessarily includes. In this view， the best advice that could be given to a person in a state of subjection is， "Comply， where the necessity of the case demands it； but criticize while you comply. Obey the unjust mandates of your governors；Chapter or this prudence and the consideration of the common safety may require；Chapter ut treat them with no false lenity， regard them with no indulgence. Obey；第一章his may be right； but beware of reverence. Reverence is nothing but wisdom and skill： government may be vested in the fittest persons； then they are entitled to reverence， because they are wise， and not because they are governors： and it may be vested in the worst. Obedience will occasionally be right in both cases： you may run south to avoid a wild beast advancing in that direction， though you want to go north. But be upon your guard against confounding things so totally unconnected with each other as a purely political obedience and respect. Government is nothing but regulated force； force is its appropriate claim on you attention. it is the business of individuals to persuade； the tendency of concentrated strength is only to give consistency and permanence to an influence more compendious than persuasion."

All this will be made somewhat clearer if we reflect on the proper correlative of obedience， authority： and here let us recur to the three sorts of obedience above specified.

The first kind of authority， then， is the authority of reason， what is really such， or is conceived to be such. The terms， both authority and obedience， are less frequently employed in this sense than in either of the following.

The second kind of authority is that which depends for its validity upon the confidence of him with whom it prevails， and is where， not having myself acquired such information as to enable me to form a judicious opinion， I yield a greater or less degree of deference to the known sentiment and decision of another. This seems to be the strictest and most precise meaning of the word authority； as obedience， in its most refined sense， denotes that compliance which is the offspring of respect.