第5章

IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it: for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill.

V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice.

But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or their near friends are to suffer.

VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men, and, by consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or Counsell, that Man or Counsell is necessarily understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City. For he that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells all men to all things which he himselfe wills; then which a greater command cannot be imagined.

VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are not united; and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one man, who hath the Right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many Citizens in all dangers, and on all occasions, as shall be needfull for common defence against the certain number, and strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it expedient) to make peace with them. We must understand therefore, that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this right (which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to the same Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War, as that of Justice, even by the constitution it selfe of a City, and essentially, doe belong to the chiefe command.

VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party: for if the Power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgement, who could not execute his commands; or if he executed them by the power of another, he himselfe is not said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he is onely an Officer. All judgement therefore in a City belongs to him who hath the swords, (i.e.) to him, who hath the supreme authority.

IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more conduceth to Peace to prevent brawles from arising, then to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum & Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evill, honest and dishonest, and the like, which every man esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evill, that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or the Lawes of the City, as being the Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future actions of his Citizens.

X. Furthermore, since the affaires of the City, both those of Warre, and Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man, or one Counsell, without Officers and subordinate Magistrates, and that it appertains to Peace, and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring counsels, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the City, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason, that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in War, and in Peace.