第35章 The Blockade Of Cuba (3)

Unless Cervera could leave Santiago, his expedition would obviously have been useless.Though it was the natural function of the American fleet to blockade him, for a week after his arrival there was an interesting game of hide and seek between the two fleets.The harbors of Cienfuegos and of Santiago are both landlocked by high hills, and Cervera had entered Santiago without being noticed by the Americans, as that part of the coast was not under blockade.Schley thought Cervera was at Cienfuegos;Sampson was of the opinion that he was at Santiago.When it became known that the enemy had taken refuge in Santiago, Schley began the blockade on the 28th of May, but stated that he could not continue long in position owing to lack of coal.On the 1st of June Sampson arrived and assumed command of the blockading squadron.

With the bottling up of Cervera, the first stage of the war passed.The navy had performed its primary function: it had established its superiority and had obtained the control of the seas.The American coast was safe; American commerce was safe except in the vicinity of Spain; and the sea was open for the passage of an American expeditionary force.Nearly the whole island of Cuba was now under blockade, and the insurgents were receiving supplies from the United States.It had been proved that the fairly even balance of the two fleets, so anxiously scanned when it was reported in the newspapers in April, was entirely deceptive when it came to real efficiency in action.

Moreover, the skillful handling of the fleets by the Naval War Board as well as by the immediate commanders had redoubled the actual superiority of the American naval forces.

A fleet in being, even though inferior and immobilized, still counts as a factor in naval warfare, and Cervera, though immobilized by Sampson, himself immobilized the greater number of American vessels necessary to blockade him.The importance of this fact was evident to every one when, in the middle of June, the remainder of the Spanish home fleet, whipped hastily into a semblance of fighting condition, set out eastward under Admiral Camara to contest the Philippines with Dewey.It was impossible for the United States to detach a force sufficient to cross the Atlantic and, without a base, meet this fleet in its home waters.

Even if a smaller squadron were dispatched from the Atlantic round Cape Horn, it would arrive in the Philippines too late to be of assistance to Dewey.The two monitors on the Pacific coast, the Monterey and the Monadnock, had already been ordered across the Pacific, a voyage perilous for vessels of their structure and agonizing to their crews; but it was doubtful whether they or Camara would arrive first in the Philippines.

The logic of the situation demanded that the main American fleet be released.Cervera must be destroyed or held in some other way than at the expense of inactivity on the part of the American warships.Santiago could not be forced by the navy.Two methods remained.The first and simpler expedient was to make the harbor mouth impassable and in this way to bottle up the Spanish fleet.

It was decided to sink the collier Merrimac at a narrow point in the channel, where, lying full length, she would completely prevent egress.It was a delicate task and one of extraordinary danger.It was characteristic of the spirit of the fleet that, as Admiral Chadwick says, practically all the men were volunteers.

The honor of the command was given to Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, Assistant Naval Constructor, who had been in charge of the preparations.With a crew of six men he entered the harbor mouth on the night of the 3d of June.A shell disabled the steering gear of the Merrimac, and the ship sank too far within the harbor to block the entrance entirely.Admiral Cervera himself rescued the crew, assured Sampson of their safety in an appreciative note; and one of the best designed and most heroic episodes in our history just missed success.

The failure of the Merrimac experiment left the situation as it had been and forced the American command to consider the second method which would release the American fleet.This new plan contemplated the reduction of Santiago by a combined military and naval attack.Cervera's choice of Santiago therefore practically determined the direction of the first American overseas military expedition, which had been in preparation since the war began.