第83章 LETTER 8(25)

I remember with how much inward impatience I assisted at conferences held with him concerning quotas for renewing the war in Spain,in the very same room,at the Cockpit,where the queen's ministers had been told in plain terms,a little before,by those of other allies,"that their masters would not consent that the Imperial and Spanish crowns should unite on the same head."That the Dutch were not averse to all treaty,but meant none wherein Great Britain was to have any particular advantage,will appear from this;that their minister declared himself ready and authorised to stop the opposition made to the queen's measures,by presenting a memorial,wherein he would declare,"that his masters entered into them,and were resolved not to continue the war for the recovery of Spain,provided the queen would consent that they should garrison Gibraltar and Port Mahon jointly with us,and share equally the Assiento,the South Sea ship,and whatever should be granted by the Spaniards to the queen and her subjects."That the whigs engaged in this league with foreign powers against their country,as well as their queen,and with a phrensy more unaccountable than that which made and maintained the solemn league and covenant formerly,will appear from this;that their attempts were directed not only to wrest the negotiations out of the queen's hands,but to oblige their country to carry on the war,on the same unequal foot that had cost her already about twenty millions more than she ought to have contributed to it.For they not only continued to abet the emperor,whose inability to supply his quota was confessed;but the Dutch likewise,after the States had refused to ratify the treaty their minister signed at London towards the end of the year one thousand seven hundred and eleven,and by which the queen united herself more closely than ever to them;engaging to pursue the war,to conclude the peace,and to guaranty it,when concluded,jointly with them;"provided they would keep the engagements they had taken with her,and the conditions of proportionate expense under which our nation had entered into the war."Upon such schemes as these was the opposition to the treaty of Utrecht carried on:and the means employed,and the means projected to be employed,were worthy of such schemes;open,direct,and indecent defiance of legal authority,secret conspiracies against the state,and base machinations against particular men,who had no other crime than that of endeavoring to conclude a war,under the authority of the queen,which a party in the nation endeavored to prolong against her authority.Had the good policy of concluding the war been doubtful,it was certainly as lawful for those,who thought it good,to advise it,as it had been for those who thought it bad,to advise the contrary:and the decision of the sovereign on the throne ought to have terminated the contest.But he who had judged by the appearances of things on one side,at that time,would have been apt to think,that putting an end to the war,or to Magna Charta,was the same thing;that the queen on the throne had no right to govern independently of her successor;nor any of her subjects a right to administer the government under her,though called to it by her,except those whom she had thought fit to lay aside.Extravagant as these principles are,no other could justify the conduct held at that time by those who opposed the peace:and as I said just now,that the phrensy of this league was more unaccountable than that of the solemn league and covenant,I might have added,that it was not very many degrees less criminal.Some of these,who charged the queen's ministers,after her death,with imaginary treasons,had been guilty during her life of real treasons:and I can compare the folly and violence of the spirit that prevailed at that time,both before the conclusion of the peace,and,under pretence of danger to the succession,after it,to nothing more nearly than to the folly and violence of the spirit that seized the tories soon after the accession of George the First.The latter indeed,which was provoked by unjust and impolitic persecution,broke out in open rebellion.The former might have done so,if the queen had lived a little longer.But to return.

The obstinate adherence of the Dutch to this league,in opposition to the queen,rendered the conferences of Utrecht,when they were opened,no better than mock conferences.Had the men who governed that commonwealth been wise and honest enough to unite,at least then,cordially with the queen,and,since they could not hinder a congress,to act in concert with her in it;we should have been still in time to maintain a sufficient union among the allies,and a sufficient superiority over the French.All the specific demands that the former made,as well as the Dutch themselves,either to incumber the negotiation,or to have in reserve,according to the artifice usually employed on such occasions,certain points from which to depart in the course of it with advantage,would not have been obtained:but all the essential demands,all in particular that were really necessary to secure the barriers in the Low Countries and of the four circles against France,would have been so.For France must have continued,in this case,rather to sue for peace,than to treat on an equal foot.