第78章 LETTER 8(20)

We were then amused with visionary schemes of marching our whole army，in a year or two more，and after a town or two more were taken，directly to Paris，or at least in the heart of France.But was this so easy or so sure a game？The French expected we would play it.Their generals had visited the several posts they might take，when our army should enter France，to retard，to incommode，to distress us in our march，and even to make a decisive stand and to give us battle.I take what I say here from indisputable authority，that of the persons consulted and employed in preparing for this great distress.

Had we been beaten，or had we been forced to retire towards our own frontier in the Low Countries，after penetrating into France，the hopes on which we protracted the war would have been disappointed，and，I think，the most sanguine，would have then repented refusing the offers made at Gertruydenberg.But if we had beaten the French，for it was scarcely lawful in those days of our presumption to suppose the contrary；would the whole monarchy of Spain have been our immediate and certain prize？Suppose，and I suppose it on good grounds，my lord，that the French had resolved to defend their country inch by inch，and that Louis the Fourteenth had determined to retire with his court to Lyons or elsewhere，and to defend the passage of the Loire，when he could no longer defend that of the Seine，rather than submit to the terms imposed on him：what should we have done in this case？Must we not have accepted such a peace as we had refused；or have protracted the war till we had conquered France first，in order to conquer Spain afterwards？Did we hope for revolutions in France？We had hoped for them in Spain：and we should have been bubbles of our hopes in both.That there was a spirit raised against the government of Louis the Fourteenth，in his court，nay，in his family，and that strange schemes of private ambition were formed and forming there，I cannot doubt：

and some effects of this spirit produced perhaps the greatest mortifications that he suffered in the latter part of his reign.

A light instance of this spirit is all I will quote at this time.I supped，in the year one thousand seven hundred and fifteen，at a house in France，where two persons，of no small figure，who had been in great company that night，arrived very late.The conversation turned on the events of the precedent war，and the negotiations of the late peace.In the process of the conversation one of them broke loose，and said，directing his discourse to me，"Vous auriez pu nous écraser dans ce tems-là：pourquoi ne l'avez-vous pas fait？"I answered him coolly，"Par ce que dans ce tems-lànous n'avons plus craint vôtre puissance."This anecdote，too trivial for history，may find its place in a letter，and may serve to confirm what I have admitted，that there were persons even in France，who expected to find their private account in the distress of their country.But these persons were a few men of wild imaginations and strong passions，more enterprising than capable，and of more name than credit.In general the endeavors of Louis the Fourteenth，and the sacrifices he offered to make in order to obtain a peace，had attached his people more than ever to him：and if Louis had determined not to go any farther than he had offered at Gertruydenberg，in abandoning his grandson，the French nation would not have abandoned him.