Letters on the Study and Use of History
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第63章 LETTER 8(5)

--Something however must be said more,to continue and wind up this summary of the latter period of modern history.

France then saw her advantage,and improved it no doubt,though not in the manner,nor with the circumstances,that some living scribblers of memorials and anecdotes have advanced.She had sent one of the ablest men of her court to that of Madrid,the marshal of Harcourt,and she had stipulated in the second treaty of partition,that the archduke should go neither into Spain nor the duchy of Milan,during the life of Charles the Second.She was willing to have her option between a treaty and a will.By the acceptation of the will,all king William's measures were broke.He was unprepared for war as much as when he made these treaties to prevent one;and if he meant in making them,what some wise,but refining men have suspected,and what I confess I see no reason to believe,only to gain time by the difficulty of executing them,and to prepare for making war,whenever the death of the king of Spain should alarm mankind,and rouse his own subjects out of their inactivity and neglect of foreign interests;if so,he was disappointed in that too;for France took possession of the whole monarchy at once,and with universal concurrence,at least without opposition or difficulty,in favor of the duke of Anjon.By what has been observed,or hinted rather very shortly,and Ifear a little confusedly,it is plain that reducing the power of France,and securing the whole Spanish succession to the house of Austria,were two points that king William,at the head of the British and Dutch commonwealths and of the greatest confederacy Europe had seen,was obliged to give up.

All the acquisitions that France cared to keep for the maintenance of her power were confirmed to her by the treaty of Ryswic:and king William allowed,indirectly at least,the pretensions of the house of Bourbon to the Spanish succession,as Louis the Fourteenth allowed,in the same manner,those of the house of Austria,by the treaties of partition.Strange situation!in which no expedient remained to prepare for an event,visibly so near,and of such vast importance as the death of the king of Spain,but a partition of his monarchy,without his consent,or his knowledge!If king William had not made his partition,the emperor would have made one,and with as little regard to trade,to the barrier of the seven provinces,or to the general system of Europe,as had been showed by him when he made the private treaty with France already mentioned,in one thousand six hundred and sixty-eight.

The ministers of Vienna were not wanting to insinuate to those of France overtures of a separate treaty,as more conducive to their common interests than the accession of his imperial majesty to that of partition.But the councils of Versailles judged very reasonably,that a partition made with England and Holland would be more effectual than any other,if a partition was to take place:and that such a partition would be just as effectual as one made with the emperor,to furnish arguments to the emissaries of France,and motives to the Spanish councils,if a will in favor of France could be obtained.I repeat it again;I cannot see what king William could do in such circumstances as he found himself in after thirty years struggle,except what he did:neither can I see how he could do what he did,especially after the resentment expressed by the Spaniards,and the furious memorial presented by Canales on the conclusion of the first treaty of partition,without apprehending that the consequence would be a will in favor of France.He was in the worst of all political circumstances,in that wherein no one good measure remains to be taken;and out of which he left the two nations,at the head of whom he had been so long,to fight and negotiate themselves and their confederates,as well as they could.

When this will was made and accepted,Louis the Fourteenth had succeeded,and the powers in opposition to him had failed,in all the great objects of interest and ambition,which they had kept in sight for more than forty years;that is from the beginning of the present period.The actors changed their parts in the tragedy that followed.The power,that had so long and so cruelly attacked,was now to defend,the Spanish monarchy:and the powers that had so long defended,were now to attack it.--Let us see how this was brought about:and that we may see it the better,and make a better judgment of all that passed from the death of Charles the Second to the peace of Utrecht,let us go back to the time of his death,and consider the circumstances that formed this complicated state of affairs,in three views;a view of right,a view of policy,and a view of power.

The right of succeeding to the crown of Spain would have been undoubtedly in the children of Maria Theresa,that is,in the house of Bourbon;if this right had not been barred by the solemn renunciations so often mentioned.

The pretensions of the house of Austria were founded on these renunciations,on the ratification of them by the Pyrenean treaty,and the confirmation of them by the will of Philip the Fourth.The pretensions of the house of Bourbon were founded on a supposition,it was indeed no more,and a vain one too,that these renunciations were in their nature null.On this foot the dispute of right stood during the life of Charles the Second,and on the same it would have continued to stand even after his death,if the renunciations had remained unshaken;if his will,like that of his father,had confirmed them,and had left the crown,in pursuance of them to the house of Austria.