第88章 Appendix I:Production,Consumption,Distribution,Exc

Hegel accordingly conceived the illusory idea that the real world is the result of thinking which causes its own synthesis,its own deepening and its own movement;whereas the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is simply the way in which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as a concrete mental category.This is,however,by no means the process of evolution of the concrete world itself.For example,the simplest economic category,e.g.,exchange-value,presupposes population,a population moreover which produces under definite conditions,as well as a distinct kind of family,or community,or State,etc.Exchange-value cannot exist except as an abstract,unilateral relation of an already existing concrete organic whole.But exchange-value as a category leads an antediluvian existence.Thus to consciousness-and this comprises philosophical consciousness --which regards the comprehending mind as the real man,and hence the comprehended world as such as the only real world;to consciousness,therefore,the evolution of categories appears as the actual process of production --which unfortunately is given an impulse from outside --whose result is the world;and this (which is however again a tautological expression)is true in so far as the concrete totality regarded as a conceptual totality,as a mental fact,is indeed a product of thinking,of comprehension;but it is by no means a product of the idea which evolves spontaneously and whose thinking proceeds outside and above perception and imagination,but is the result of the assimilation and transformation of perceptions and images into concepts.The totality as a conceptual entity seen by the intellect is a product of the thinking intellect which assimilates the world in the only way open to it,a way which differs from the artistic,religious and practically intelligent assimilation of this world.The concrete subject remains outside the intellect and independent of it --that is so long as the intellect adopts a purely speculative,purely theoretical attitude.

The subject,society,must always be envisaged therefore as the pre-condition of comprehension even when the theoretical method is employed.

But have not these simple categories also an independent historical or natural existence preceding that of the more concrete ones?This depends.

Hegel,for example,correctly takes ownership,the simplest legal relation of the subject,as the point of departure of the philosophy of law.No ownership exists,however,before the family or the relations of master and servant are evolved,and these are much more concrete relations.It would,on the other hand,be correct to say that families and entire tribes exist which have as yet only possessions and not property .

The simpler category appears thus as a relation of simple family or tribal communities to property.In societies which have reached a higher stage the category appears as a comparatively simple relation existing in a more advanced community.The concrete substratum underlying the relation of ownership is however always presupposed.One can conceive an individual savage who has possessions;possession in this case,however,is not a legal relation.It is incorrect that in the course of historical development possession gave rise to the family.On the contrary,possession always presupposes this "more concrete legal category".One may,nevertheless,conclude that the simple categories represent relations or conditions which may reflect the immature concrete situation without as yet positing the more complex relation or condition which is conceptually expressed in the more concrete category;on the other hand,the same category may be retained as a subordinate relation in more developed concrete circumstances.Money may exist and has existed in historical time before capital,banks,wage-labour,etc.came into being.In this respect it can be said,therefore,that the simpler category expresses relations predominating in an immature entity or subordinate relations in a more advanced entity;relations which already existed historically before the entity had developed the aspects expressed in a more concrete category.The procedure of abstract reasoning which advances from the simplest to more complex concepts to that extent conforms to actual historical development.

It is true,on the other hand,that there are certain highly developed,but nevertheless historically immature,social formations which employ some of the most advanced economic forms,e.g.,cooperation,developed division of labour,etc.,without having developed any money at all,for instance Peru.In Slavonic communities too,money --and its pre-condition,exchange --is of little or no importance within the individual community,but is used on the borders,where commerce with other communities takes place;and it is altogether wrong to assume that exchange within the community is an original constituent element.On the contrary,in the beginning exchange tends to arise in the intercourse of different communities with one another,rather than among members of the same community.Moreover,although money begins to play a considerable role very early and in diverse ways,it is known to have been a dominant factor in antiquity only among nations developed in a particular direction,i.e.,merchant nations.Even among the Greeks and Romans,the most advanced nations of antiquity,money reaches its full development,which is presupposed in modern bourgeois society,only in the period of their disintegration.Thus the full potential of this quite simple category does not emerge historically in the most advanced phases of society,and it certainly does not penetrate into all economic relations.